A Transferência de Líderes de Organizações Criminosas Aumenta o Crime Local? O Caso de Marcola 

Authors

  • Caique Melo Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
  • Diogo Britto Bocconi University
  • Bladimir Carrillo Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
  • Breno Sampaio Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
  • Gustavo Sampaio Universidade Federal de Pernambuco
  • Paulo Vaz Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1234/rbep.v1i2.203

Keywords:

Crime, Controle Sintético, Distrito Federal

Abstract

Marcola, leader of the largest and most powerful criminal organization in Brazil, the First Command of the Capital (PCC), was transferred to the Federal Penitentiary of Brasília in March 2019. The purpose of the transfer was to break the prisoner's ties, isolating him from the other members of the organization. This paper investigates whether the arrival of the PCC leader resulted in any impact on local criminal activity. For this purpose, we use data from the National System of Statistics on Public Security and Criminal Justice and the population of criminal (and civil) lawsuits filed in the first degree sections of all 27 Brazilian State Courts. The dynamic of cargo theft, vehicle theft/robbery, economically motivated crimes, homicides and other violent crimes are investigated. The results do not support the claim that Marcola's transfer had a positive effect on crime in the region.

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Author Biographies

Caique Melo, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

Doutorando em Economia, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco. Endereço: Departamento de Economia, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Av. Prof. Moraes Rego, 1235 - Cidade Universitária, Recife - PE, 50670-901.

Diogo Britto, Bocconi University

Ph.D. em Law and Economics, Departamento de Economia, University of Bologna. Endereço: Department of Social and Political Sciences, Via Roentgen 1, room 5b11320136,  Milão, Itália.

Bladimir Carrillo, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

Ph.D. em Economia, Universidade Federal de Vicosa. Endereço: Departamento de Economia, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Av. Prof. Moraes Rego, 1235 - Cidade Universitária, Recife - PE, 50670-901.

Breno Sampaio, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

Ph.D. em Economia, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Endereço: Departamento de Economia, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Av. Prof. Moraes Rego, 1235 - Cidade Universitária, Recife - PE, 50670-901.

Gustavo Sampaio, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

Ph.D. em Economia, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Endereço: Departamento de Economia, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Av. Prof. Moraes Rego, 1235 - Cidade Universitária, Recife - PE, 50670-901.

Paulo Vaz, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco

Ph.D. em Economia, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Endereço: Departamento de Economia, Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Av. Prof. Moraes Rego, 1235 - Cidade Universitária, Recife - PE, 50670-901.

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Published

2020-09-03

How to Cite

Melo, C., Britto, D., Carrillo, B., Sampaio, B., Sampaio, G., & Vaz, P. (2020). A Transferência de Líderes de Organizações Criminosas Aumenta o Crime Local? O Caso de Marcola . Brazilian Journal of Criminal Execution, 1(2), 17–44. https://doi.org/10.1234/rbep.v1i2.203